Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| One, number 1: in modern logic it is not possible to introduce the number one directly. It must be introduced indirectly, via existential quantification ("for at least one x ...") and universal quantification ("for all x ..."). In addition, identity is needed. See also definition, identity, logic, elementary logic, number theory, numbers._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on One (Number 1) - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 218 "One"/Medieval/"Existentially generic"/Lewis: E.g. If one pig is male, one is female, then "a pig" is both male and female at the same time - "universally generic": only has the properties that each x has - i.e. neither male nor female ... Solution/Lewis: character: set of properties of a thing. Generic pigs cannot exist, but their characters can. Individual character: maximum compatible set of properties, so that one thing could have all and only these particular properties - otherwise it is a generic character. Benson Mates: eliminates things in general in favor of "clusters of properties". Cf. >Bundle theory. Then extension for Nominal phrase NP: characters are individual or generic - for general terms sets of individual characters. Name/Lewis: is an NP that never has a generic character as an extension to any index. >Numbers, >Zero, >Indexicality, >Properties/Lewis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to One (Number 1)
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29